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1 
ARTICLE 
 
Cleaning Up Our Toxic Coasts: 
A Precautionary and Human Health-Based 
Approach to Coastal Adaptation 
 
ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG* 
 Hurricanes in the United States in 2005, 2012, and 2017 have 
all revealed an insidious problem for coastal climate change 
adaptation: toxic contamination in the coastal zone. As sea levels 
rise and violent coastal storms become increasingly frequent, this 
legacy of toxic pollution threatens immediate emergency response, 
longer term human health, and coastal ecosystems’ capacity to 
adapt to changing coastal conditions. 
Focusing on Hurricane Harvey’s 2017 devastation of Houston, 
Texas, as its primary example, this Article first discusses the toxic 
legacy still present in many coastal environments. It then examines 
the existing laws available to clean up the coastal zone—CERCLA, 
RCRA, and the Coastal Zone Management Act at the federal level, 
land use planning, and state tort law—both to identify ways in 
which states and the federal government could more effectively 
implement existing law and to suggest improvements to these 
existing laws to more emphatically prioritize the elimination of 
toxic coastal legacies. It concludes with three specific 
recommendations that precautionarily prioritize human health 
considerations in coastal management as a means of reducing 
coastal toxicity in the Anthropocene. 
 
 
 
*  James I. Farr Presidential Endowed Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. 
Quinney College of Law, Salt Lake City, UT. My thanks to Professor Jason 
Czarnezki, Managing Editor James J. Creech, and the staff of the Pace 
Environmental Law Review for inviting me to participate in their April 2018 
symposium on “Climate Change, Coasts, and Precaution.” This research was 
also made possible, in part, through generous support from the Albert and 
Elaine Borchard Fund for Faculty Excellence. The author may be reached at 
robin.craig@law.utah.edu. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 When Hurricane Harvey, a Category 4 hurricane, made 
landfall on the central Texas coast, just north of Corpus Christi, on 
August 25, 2017,1 it demonstrated both the power and the danger 
of coastal storms in ways that should be relevant for U.S. coastal 
policy throughout the 21st century. First, Harvey was huge and 
repeatedly battered the Gulf Coast. At its first landfall, the 
hurricane was 280 miles in diameter and had 130 mile-per-hour 
winds.2 It moved north to Houston the next day, remained there 
for four days, then made landfall, a third time, on August 29, at 
Port Arthur and Beaumont, Texas, near the Louisiana border.3 
While Hurricane Harvey concentrated its force on Texas and 
Louisiana, “[i]t affected 13 million people from Texas through 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky.”4 The storm 
killed 88 people5 and left thousands more homeless.6 
Second, Hurricane Harvey brought record-breaking rainfall—
and subsequent unprecedented flooding—to the Gulf Coast.7 As 
noted, the hurricane stalled out over Houston, dropping two feet of 
rain in the first 24 hours and 40 inches over 48 hours.8 Two 
reservoirs overflowed.9 When the hurricane made landfall for the 
third time, “[i]t dumped 26 inches of rain in 24 hours” at the 
Louisiana border,10 then rained an additional 10 inches on 
Nashville, Tennessee, on September 1.11 In an attempt to describe 
 
1. Kimberly Amadeo, Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs, THE 
BALANCE (Aug. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/74LQ-9JHL.  
2. Id.; Hurricane Harvey Aftermath: What Happened and What’s Next, CNN, 
https://perma.cc/KF95-T6CL [hereinafter Hurricane Harvey Aftermath]. 
3. Amadeo, supra note 1.  
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. See Robin Kundis Craig, Harvey, Irma, and the NFIP: Did the 2017 
Hurricane Season Matter to Flood Insurance Reauthorization?, 40.3 UNIV. OF ARK. 
AT LITTLE ROCK L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) for a more comprehensive discussion 
of Hurricane Harvey’s flooding and its potential implications for reauthorization 
of the National Flood Insurance Program. 
8. Id.; cf. Amadeo, supra note 1 (“In comparison, Hurricane Katrina dropped 
5-20 inches of rain in just 48 hours. Most of its flooding came from storm surges 
that overwhelmed the levee system.”).  
9. Amadeo, supra note 1.  
10. Id.; Hurricane Harvey Aftermath, supra note 2. 
11. Amadeo, supra note 1.  
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the scale of the rainfall, a Washington Post reporter noted that “[a]t 
least 20 inches of rain fell over an area (nearly 29,000 square miles) 
larger than 10 states, including West Virginia and Maryland (by a 
factor of more than two)” and “[a]t least 30 inches of rain fell over 
an area (more than 11,000 square miles) equivalent to Maryland’s 
size.”12 At the storm’s peak on September 1, one-third of Houston 
was underwater,13 and “[t]otal rainfall hit 51.88 inches in Cedar 
Bayou on the outskirts of Houston. That’s a record for a single 
storm in the continental United States.”14 
Third, Harvey may be the first hurricane for which scientists 
agree that climate change made a significant contribution to the 
storm’s severity.15 While scientists still will not assert that climate 
change “causes” any particular coastal storm, in December 2017, 
two research groups concluded that Harvey’s record rainfall “was 
as much as 38 percent higher than would be expected in a world 
that was not warming.”16 Warmer-than-normal air and ocean 
water temperatures, sea levels that are six inches higher than 20 
years ago, and climate change-affected weather patterns that 
promote storm stalling may all have contributed to Harvey’s 
record-breaking precipitation.17 In addition, both studies “found 
that climate change roughly tripled the odds of a Harvey-type 
 
12. Jason Samenow, Harvey is a 1000-year Flood Event Unprecedented in 
Scale, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/4G3B-2EG2.   
13. Amadeo, supra note 1. 
14. Id.; see also Hurricane Harvey Aftermath, supra note 2.  
15. Amadeo, supra note 1; see also Geert Jan van Oldenborgh et al., 
Attribution of Extreme Rainfall From Hurricane Harvey, August 2017, 12 ENVTL. 
RES. LETTERS 124009, 10 (2017); Mark D. Risser & Michael F. Wehner, 
Attributable Human-Induced Changes in the Likelihood and Magnitude of the 
Observed Extreme Precipitation during Hurricane Harvey, 44 GEOPHYSICAL RES. 
LETTERS 12,457, 12,463 (2017); Henry Fountain, Scientists Link Hurricane 
Harvey’s Record Rainfall to Climate Change, N.Y.  TIMES (Dec. 13, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/8D42-UHKV. 
16. Fountain, supra note 15; accord Michael Greshko, Climate Change Likely 
Supercharged Hurricane Harvey, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Dec. 13, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/Y5EP-YMCR (reporting the same 38 percent high). See also 
Oldenborgh et al., supra note 15, at 124009 (reporting 15 percent as most 
probable); Risser & Wehner, supra note 15, at 12,463 (reporting 18 to 19 percent 
as most probable). 
17. Amadeo, supra note 1; see also German Lopez, How Global Warming 
Likely Made Harvey Much Worse, Explained By a Climatologist, VOX (Aug. 28, 
2017), https://perma.cc/K65Z-QQ8X.  
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss1/1
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storm.”18 Thus, as climate scientists have long predicted,19 it 
appears that climate change is already increasing the likelihood of 
more severe hurricanes. 
Finally, and of particular relevance to this Article, Hurricane 
Harvey demonstrated, in immediately comprehensible ways, the 
latent toxicity of the United States’ coasts. For example, among 
other issues, “Harvey flooded 800 wastewater treatment facilities 
and 13 Superfund sites . . . spread[ing] sewage and toxic chemicals 
into the flooded areas.”20 As will be discussed in more detail in Part 
II, Harvey, and to a lesser extent Hurricane Irma, caused 
significant toxic pollutant loading in the communities they 
affected, particularly Houston. Given the prediction of growing 
numbers of increasingly severe coastal storms throughout the 21st 
century,21 Harvey and Irma make compelling cases for a more 
precautionary and health-based approach to coastal management 
that prioritizes: (1) cleaning up current coastal contamination; (2) 
retrofitting existing coastal facilities that handle hazardous and 
toxic materials to prevent further coastal contamination; and (3) 
limiting the siting of additional such facilities in the coastal zone 
in the future. 
This Article explores the toxic risks along the United States’ 
coasts, particularly in light of the increasing threat from coastal 
storms. It begins in Part II by providing an overview of existing 
contamination in the United States coastal zones, focusing on the 
damage that Hurricane Harvey caused in its interactions with 
Houston’s many hazardous waste sites and toxics-handling 
facilities. Part III then reviews existing legal authorities for 
dealing with coastal toxicity in both federal and state 
environmental and tort law. Part IV offers suggestions for a more 
precautionary and health-based approach to coastal toxicity, 
emphasizing both cleanup of existing problems and more toxicity-
sensitive engagement in coastal land use planning and building 
codes. The Article concludes that there is much that federal, 
 
18. Greshko, supra note 16; see also Oldenborgh et al., supra note 15, at 1. 
19. E.g., IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 53 (2014) 
(discussing the fact that cimate change is likely to make coastal storms more 
intense), available at https://perma.cc/PMB6-7WGA [hereinafter 2014 IPCC 
SYNTHESIS REPORT]. 
20. Amadeo, supra note 1. 
21. 2014 IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 19, at 53. 
5
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coastal-state, and local governments could do to reduce toxicity 
exposure along the coasts during coastal storms, emphasizing that 
these measures also make considerable sense as climate change 
adaptation strategies. 
II. THE UNITED STATES’ TOXIC COASTS 
A. An Overview of Coastal Toxicity in the United 
States 
The United States is a coastal nation. As of 2010, over half of 
the U.S. population (excluding Alaska) “lived in one of the nation’s 
673 coastal counties.”22 “Between 1960 and 2008, the national 
coastline population rose by 84 percent, compared with 64 percent 
inland, according to the Census Bureau.”23 Moreover, coastal U.S. 
populations continue to grow at a faster pace than inland 
populations,24 despite significant hurricane seasons in 2005 
(Katrina), 2012 (Sandy), and 2017 (Harvey, Irma, and Maria). 
Thus, any risks to coastal populations pose a significant national 
problem. 
The nation’s coasts receive toxic and hazardous pollution and 
exposure from a number of sources. For example, upstream 
agricultural and urban runoff carries pesticides, oil, grease, heavy 
metals, pathogens, pharmaceuticals, and other contaminants 
downstream to coastal communities and ecosystems;25 mercury 
has shown up in California coastal fog banks.26 In addition, 
between 1918 and 1970, the Department of Defense disposed of 
chemical weapons in the ocean, including sulphur mustard and 
 
22. NAT’L OCEAN SERVICE, COASTAL HAZARDS: PREPARING FOR THE THREATS 
THAT FACE OUR COASTAL COMMUNITIES, https://perma.cc/ZNN7-3YAB; see also 
Sarah G. McCarthy et al., Coastal Storms, Toxic Runoff, and the Sustainable 
Conservation of Fish and Fisheries, 64 AM. FISHERIES SOC’Y SYMP. 1, 2 (2008), 
https://perma.cc/QJ3Y-8UA (noting that this land area represents only 17 percent 
of the United States). 
23. Jeff Donn, U.S. Coastal Population Continues to Grow Despite Lessons of 
Past Storms, THE DENVER POST (Sept. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/U64U-T2DD. 
24. Id. 
25. Id.; see also National Institutes of Health, U.S. Medical Library: 
ToxTown: Runoff, https://perma.cc/H8JX-6S7Y. 
26. Alison Hawkes, Toxic Fog? Mercury Showing Up in Coastal California 
Fog Banks, KQED SCI. (Dec. 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/W7PT-BWCE. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss1/1
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chemical nerve agents, along all three U.S. coasts.27 However, the 
Department concluded in a 2016 report to Congress that these 
wastes do not pose a significant threat to human health or the 
environment and that removal is not warranted.28 Facilities 
emitting air pollutants, including power plants and waste 
incinerators, can also be sources of coastal toxic exposure.29 
The underappreciated but far more worrisome sources of 
coastal toxics with respect to hurricanes and sea-level rise, 
however, are land-based contaminated sites—landfills, illegal 
hazardous waste disposal sites, and legacy toxic waste dumps—
and ongoing facilities that handle toxic and hazardous substances. 
Assembling some sense of how significant a risk these sites pose, 
however, requires much digging through multiple sources. At the 
federal level, for instance, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) tracks hazardous disposal sites through the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (“CERCLA,” often referred to as Superfund).30 Just a 
glance at the EPA’s map31 of sites listed on the National Priorities 
List (“NPL”)32 indicates that many coastal cities contain significant 
concentrations of these highly-toxic Superfund sites, especially 
Seattle, Washington; San Francisco, California; Los Angeles, 
California; Houston, Texas; Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Pensacola, 
Florida; Tampa/St. Petersburg, Florida; Jacksonville, Florida; 
Wilmington, North Carolina; and essentially the entire Atlantic 
coast from Norfolk, Virginia, north to Portland, Maine. 
 
27. DAVID M. BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33432, U.S. DISPOSAL OF 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE OCEAN: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2 
(2007), https://perma.cc/W6KQ-83CU. 
28. U.S. DEP’T. OF DEF., RESEARCH RELATED TO EFFECT OF OCEAN DISPOSAL OF 
MUNITIONS IN U.S. COASTAL WATERS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/34WB-PCJK .  
29. See, e.g., TOXICS ACTION CENTER, TOXICS IN MASSACHUSETTS: A TOWN-BY-
TOWN PROFILE 12-16 (2010) [hereinafter Toxics Action Center], 
https://perma.cc/HJX3-LAF5 (discussing air pollution as a toxicity problem in 
Massachusetts and providing maps of power plants and waste incineration 
facilities that show where these sources are located along the coast).  
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (West 2018). 
31. Superfund National Priorities List Map, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://perma.cc/6LVT-2N5Y [hereinafter Superfund Map]; see also Cleanups in 
My Community Map, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://perma.cc/X4U6-7Q92  
[hereinafter My Community Map]. 
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c)(1); Superfund Map, supra note 31.  
7
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The EPA regulates ongoing industrial facilities that could pose 
hazardous or toxic waste problems through the federal Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”).33 Releases at hazardous 
waste treatment, storage, and disposal (“TSD”) facilities require 
corrective actions—that is, cleanups.34 While the EPA does not 
keep cleanup statistics in terms of inland versus coastal 
communities, its “Cleanups in My Community” map indicates that 
RCRA corrective action sites are approximately as prevalent as 
NPL sites, roughly doubling the federally-actionable contaminated 
toxic sites along the U.S. coasts.35 
State-specific information can also help to flesh out our 
understanding of the latent toxicity of the nation’s coasts. In 
Massachusetts, for example, RCRA large-quantity hazardous 
waste generators, CERCLA NPL sites, and state-designated Tier 1 
hazardous waste sites are concentrated along the coast.36 Together 
with landfills, power plants, and incinerators, these sites produce 
a rather pronounced coastal toxic load, especially around Boston.37 
As the Toxics Action Center has summarized: 
Massachusetts has thousands of potential and identified 
hazardous waste sites awaiting cleanup, some of the worst air 
quality in the nation, and rivers and lakes polluted by 
industrial contaminants and toxic mercury. Asthma and 
cancer rates are some of the highest in the country, and both 
can be linked to environmental causes. Massachusetts is also 
plagued by economic disparities. Poor urban areas are often the 
most overburdened by toxic pollution.38 
Although characterization of the toxic burden and risks facing 
citizens living on the United States’ coasts remains incomplete, 
scientists, as well as federal and state agencies, have compiled 
enough data to suggest that coastal residents should be concerned. 
For example, between 1991 and 1997, the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”) analyzed 1,543 surface 
sediment samples from 25 estuaries and marine bays—i.e., the 
 
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k. 
34. Id. §§ 6924(u), (v). 
35. My Community Map, supra note 31.  
36. See TOXICS ACTION CENTER, supra note 29, at 11, 19, 21 (providing maps). 
37. See id. at 26 (showing the cumulative concentration of toxic facilities). 
38. Id. at 4. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss1/1
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sediments closest to shore—from all three U.S. coasts (Gulf, 
Atlantic, and Pacific), concluding that about 6 percent of the coast 
was toxic; the EPA’s parallel study calculated that 7 percent of the 
coast was toxic.39 However, tests based on sub-lethal effects on 
marine organisms suggested a much broader problem, with 25 to 
39 percent of the U.S. coasts returning toxic results.40 
Another indicator for concern comes from the EPA’s semi-
regular National Coastal Condition Reports, which contain 
summaries of fish tissue contamination by region, providing 
another indicator of coastal toxic exposure.41 Specifically, the fish 
tissue assessment looks at the concentration of various toxics—
arsenic, cadmium, mercury, selenium, chlordane, DDT, dieldrin, 
endosulfan, endrin, heptachlor epoxide, hexachlorobenzene, 
lindane, mirex, toxaphene, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons 
(“PAHs”), and polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”)—in fish, and 
assesses coastal conditions based on risks to human health 
through fish consumption.42 In the latest National Coastal 
Condition Report from 2012, 13 percent of U.S. coasts, overall, 
were in poor condition for fish tissue contamination, but regions 
ranged from zero percent in poor condition (southeastern Alaska 
and Guam) to 20 percent in poor condition along the northeast 
coast (although, notably, the calculations did not include the area 
of the Gulf of Mexico’s dead zone).43 Another 13 percent of U.S. 
coasts, overall, were in fair condition,44 indicating that, in total, 
over one-quarter of the nation’s coasts face some risk from toxicity. 
The EPA further noted that areas “in poor and fair condition were 
dominated by samples with elevated concentrations of total PCBs, 
total DDT, total PAHs, and mercury.”45 
The National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) has compiled data 
from the EPA’s Superfund database for CERCLA and its Toxic 
Release Inventory (“TRI”) database for the federal Emergency 
 
39. Edward R. Long, Spatial Extent of Sediment Toxicity in U.S. Estuaries 
and Marine Bays, in MONITORING ECOLOGICAL CONDITION IN THE WESTERN UNITED 
STATES 391, 391, 403-05 (2000). 
40. Id. 
41. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL COASTAL CONDITION REPORT IV 
(2012), https://perma.cc/YVM3-7RZ3. 
42. Id. at 25.  
43. Id. at tbl. ES-2.  
44. Id. at fig. 2-10. 
45. Id. at 49. 
9
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Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”),46 as well 
as several other sources of information from both the federal 
government and Canada,47 to create TOXMAP,48 a map of releases 
of specific toxic chemicals across the United States. Designed 
originally to facilitate emergency response,49 EPCRA requires all 
U.S. facilities releasing listed toxic and hazardous substances at or 
above reportable thresholds to report those releases,50 which the 
EPA then complies into the TRI database.51 TOXMAP makes clear 
that larger cities, whether coastal or not, generally endure the 
greatest concentrations of toxic releases. Nevertheless, as was true 
for the EPA’s “Cleanups in My Community” map, many coastal 
areas light up particularly brightly on the NIH’s TOXMAP—
Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles on the Pacific coast; 
Houston, New Orleans, and Tampa on the Gulf coast; Milwaukee, 
Chicago, and Detroit along the Great Lakes; and almost all of 
Florida’s and the northeastern states’ Atlantic coasts.52 
Such compilations and characterizations of “standard” 
toxicity, however, do not paint the full picture of coastal toxic risk. 
Coastal storms and hurricanes can dramatically increase coastal 
communities’ acute and even longer-term toxic exposure. 
Moreover, toxic sites and infrastructure along the coast pose long-
term concerns in the face of global sea-level rise. Hurricane Harvey 
provided a particularly graphic example of how storms can interact 
with coastal toxicity to pose significant human health concerns. 
B. Hurricane Harvey and Houston, August-September 
2017 
Hurricanes in the United States dramatically illuminate the 
latent toxicity of coastal zone infrastructure and reveal the fact 
that invading seawater threatens both unusually high emissions 
 
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (West 2018). 
47. TOXMAP Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
https://perma.cc/Y3E7-SXPZ. 
48. TOXMAP Home Page, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
https://perma.cc/XUQ7-RUXJ.  
49. 42 U.S.C. § 11003(a). 
50. Id. §§ 11002, 11023. 
51. Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://perma.cc/P3RD-AX7W. 
52. TOXMAP Home Page,  supra note 48. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss1/1
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of hazardous air pollutants and a toxic soup of sewage, oil, and 
hazardous chemicals from coastal businesses (such as dry cleaners 
and auto repair facilities), industrial sites, Superfund sites, and 
toxic waste facilities.53 While the full threat of dissolved and 
mixing toxic chemicals has not yet been fully realized as a result of 
a major U.S. coastal storm, some have come alarmingly close. For 
example, after Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans in 
2005, “hazardous substances such as volatile organic compounds 
(“VOCs”), lead, and arsenic were detected in the air, soil, and 
sediment samples,” and “the potential for a toxic release of 
hazardous substances after a storm exist[ed].”54 Similarly, after 
Hurricane Sandy hit “New York and New Jersey in 2012, officials 
had to monitor 247 Superfund sites—one of which, the Gowanus 
Canal, overflowed into people’s homes.”55 
1. Waste-Related Spills During Hurricane Harvey 
Hurricane Harvey’s 2017 flooding of the Houston area—the 
United States’ fourth largest city—may produce one of the most 
toxic legacies of U.S. hurricanes. To begin, Harvey inundated 
thirteen of the Houston area’s forty-one hazardous waste sites,56 
and the city contains “several other highly toxic sites managed by 
 
53. Kathryn Lane et al., Health Effects of Coastal Storms and Flooding in 
Urban Areas: A Review and Vulnerability Assessment, 2013 J. ENVTL. & PUBLIC 
HEALTH 1, 2 (2013); see also Danny D. Reible et al., Toxic and Contaminant 
Concerns Generated by Hurricane Katrina, 36 THE BRIDGE 5, 5 (2006), 
https://perma.cc/7PD2-LB59. 
54. Lane et al., supra note 53, at 5; see also Steven M. Presley et al., 
Assessment of Pathogens and Toxicants in New Orleans, LA Following Hurricane 
Katrina, 40 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 468, 468 (2006), https://perma.cc/8PHU-C8AW 
(“Concentrations of aldrin, arsenic, lead, and seven semivolatile organic 
compounds in sediments/soils exceeded one or more United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (USEPA) thresholds for human health soil screening levels and 
high priority bright line screening levels.”). 
55. Emily Atkin, America Has a Toxic Waste Hurricane Problem, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC (Sept. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/69RK-MG6F; see also Elizabeth A. 
Harris, In Brooklyn, Worrying About Not Only Flooding but What’s in the Water, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2012), https://perma.cc/SMK8-PRG8 (reporting on the 
Gowanus Canal Superfund site overflow). 
56. Atkin, supra note 55; see also Troy Griggs et al., More Than 40 Sites 
Released Hazardous Pollutants Because of Hurricane Harvey, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
8, 2017), https://perma.cc/G3K2-TYA9. 
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the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality.”57 (Notably, a 
few weeks later, Hurricane Irma was even worse in terms of 
threatened superfund sites: eighty such sites stood in Hurricane 
Irma’s path through Florida).58 The New York Times described 
Harvey’s floodwaters as “a stew of toxic chemicals, sewage, debris 
and waste . . . Runoff from the city’s sprawling petroleum and 
chemicals complex contains any number of hazardous compounds. 
Lead, arsenic and other toxic and carcinogenic elements may be 
leaching from some two dozen Superfund sites in the Houston 
area.”59 
The worst of the inundated waste sites was the San Jacinto 
Waste Pits, a “dioxin-laden federal Superfund site whose 
protective cap was damaged by the raging San Jacinto River.”60 
The highly contaminated waste pits are located “right next to 
homes and schools, and that has frightened residents for 
decades.”61 The site consists of two waste pits in the middle of the 
San Jacinto river, where a paper mill dumped its wastes, 
specifically dioxin and furans, during the 1960s.62 Paper companies 
used dioxin to bleach paper white, and the compound is toxic at 
parts per quadrillion.63 Temporary concrete caps installed in 2011 
were supposed to keep the pits from further contaminating the 
river, but Hurricane Harvey caused the river to rip through them,64 
releasing contamination. 
However, smaller waste spills were also noteworthy. For 
example, W&P Development Corp. owns “an industrial park where 
about 100,000 gallons of oily wastewater were reported to have 
spilled into the San Jacinto from August 29 to August 31. The site 
 
57. Darryl Fears & Brady Dennis, Houston’s Polluted Superfund Sites 
Threaten to Contaminate Floodwaters, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/3HUH-FGRM. 
58. Atkin, supra note 55.  
59. Hiroko Tabuchi & Sheila Kaplan, A Sea of Health and Environmental 
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was formerly Champion Paper Mill and a landfill there received 
wastes including turpentine- and lead-contaminated soil and 
mercury until 2008.”65 
Wastewaters also proved to be problematic. “The largest spill, 
by far, was at ExxonMobil Corp.’s Olefins Plant in Baytown, east 
of the ship channel. Two days after Harvey hit, some 457 million 
gallons of stormwater mixed with untreated wastewater, including 
oil and grease, surged into an adjacent creek.”66 Floodwaters also 
became contaminated with sewage, and tested floodwater samples 
revealed E. coli bacteria concentrations ten to eighty times higher 
than the EPA’s recommendations for recreational water quality 
(the recommendation for drinking water is zero), although all the 
tests for heavy metals revealed concentrations below the EPA’s 
levels of concern.67 
2. Petroleum-Related Spills in Houston During 
Hurricane Harvey 
Houston has more sources of toxicity than just waste sites. 
“Some 500 chemical plants, 10 refineries and more than 6,670 
miles of intertwined oil, gas and chemical pipelines line the 
nation’s largest energy corridor.”68 The city is, of course, famous for 
its oil industry, including oil refineries. Needless to say, record 
flooding and oil refineries don’t mix well. For example, “storage 
tanks holding crude oil, gasoline and toxic contaminants failed 
when storm water from Harvey caused them to collapse, spilling at 
least 145,000 gallons of fuel and polluting the air.”69 Benzene 
contamination of the air proved particularly troubling. 
“Preliminary air sampling in the Manchester district of Houston 
showed concentrations of up to 324 parts per billion of benzene”—
a concentration “above the level at which federal safety officials 
recommend special breathing equipment for workers.”70 In late 
August 2017, ExxonMobil acknowledged “that Hurricane Harvey 
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damaged two of its refineries, causing the release of hazardous 
pollutants”—specifically, high emissions of volatile organic 
compounds and over one million pounds of sulfur dioxide,71 both of 
which are regulated air pollutants under the Clean Air Act.72 
Initial reports from Texas regulators indicate that, because of 
Hurricane Harvey, “the region’s massive petrochemical industry 
released more than 2 million pounds of harmful pollutants into the 
air as of Aug. 29”—“roughly 40 percent of what the entire Houston 
region released in 2016 . . . .”73 As of October 2017, the EPA was 
still assessing three reported spills at US Oil Recovery, described 
by news outlets as “a former petroleum industry waste processing 
plant contaminated with a dangerous brew of cancer-causing 
chemicals.”74 
Numerous other petroleum-related spills also occurred. 
Flooding in Panther Creek, for example, caused several releases, 
including a “460,000-gallon gasoline spill at a Magellan Midstream 
Partners tank farm and nearly 52,000 pounds of crude oil from a 
Seaway Crude Pipeline Inc. tank.”75 Residents of Galena Park, a 
mostly Latino neighborhood, were subjected to more than one 
dozen releases within a two-mile radius as a result of Harvey, 
including a gasoline spill at the Magellan terminal initially 
reported at 42,000 gallons but eventually revealed to be ten times 
bigger.76 In addition, “[t]he spill ranked as Texas’ largest reported 
Harvey-related venting of air pollutants, at 1,143 tons.”77 
3. Chemical Spills in Houston During Hurricane 
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Harvey 
As noted, Houston is also home to, or near, 500 chemical 
plants, many of which were flooded. As CBS News reported in 
March 2018: 
Nearly half a billion gallons of industrial wastewater mixed with 
storm water surged out of just one chemical plant in Baytown, 
east of Houston on the upper shores of Galveston Bay. Benzene, 
vinyl chloride, butadiene and other known human carcinogens 
were among the dozens of tons of industrial toxins released into 
surrounding neighborhoods and waterways following Harvey’s 
torrential rains.78 
Some of the chemical releases created acutely dangerous 
conditions. For example, on August 28: 
 [A]n 18-inch pipeline leak at Williams Midstream Services Inc. 
unleashed a plume of [hydrogen chloride gas] near the 
intersection of two major highways in La Porte, southeast of 
Houston, where the San Jacinto River meets the 50-mile ship 
channel. It’s the petrochemical corridor’s main artery that 
empties into Galveston Bay.79 
The resulting toxic cloud of hydrochloric acid spread about one-
quarter mile through the industrial neighborhood, forcing people 
to remain inside lest the vaporized acid burn their skin and lungs 
or suffocate and kill them.80 At the Channel Biorefinery & 
Terminals, “some 80,000 gallons of methanol spilled from a tank 
rupture into Greens Bayou, which enters the ship channel just 
downstream of the Magellan terminal. Highly flammable and 
explosive, methanol can cause brain lesions and other disorders.”81 
Many other notable chemical releases occurred in and around 
Houston during Harvey. Royal Dutch Shell PLC’s Deer Park 
complex on the ship channel’s south bank released more than 3,000 
pounds of benzene and the company initially reported a 1,000-
pound release of phenol, “which can burn skin and be potentially 
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fatal . . . .”82 The Chevron Phillips Chemical Company plant in 
Baytown released “[a]bout 34,000 pounds of sodium hydroxide, or 
lye, which can cause severe chemical burns, and unpermitted 
airborne emissions, including 28,000 pounds of benzene . . . .”83 
One of the worst hit chemical plants during Hurricane Harvey 
was the Arkema chemical plant, about twenty miles northeast of 
Houston,84 which is considered one of the most hazardous plants in 
Texas.85 Harvey’s rains inundated the plant, causing it to lose 
power, which in turn led to a loss of refrigeration.86 
The plant manufactures organic peroxides commonly used in 
everyday products like kitchen countertops, industrial paints, 
polystyrene cups and plates, and PVC piping. The materials must 
be kept very cool, otherwise there is “the potential for a chemical 
reaction leading to a fire and/or explosion within the site 
confines,” Arkema said.87 
Arkema itself reported the sequence of events as follows: 
 The plant made extensive preparations prior to Hurricane 
Harvey. We have backup generators at the site solely for the 
purpose of being a redundant power supply for refrigeration 
necessary for the safe storage of products. We also brought in 
diesel powered refrigerated tank trailers and additional fuel as a 
further redundancy. Employees safely shut down all operations 
on Friday, August 25, prior to the hurricane’s landfall. We left a 
small “ride-out” crew on site to address situations that could arise 
at the site during the storm to protect the safety and security of 
the community.  The site lost primary power early Sunday 
morning August 27.  The additional back-up generators 
subsequently were inundated by water and failed. On Monday, 
August 28 temperature sensitive products were transferred into 8 
diesel-powered refrigerated containers where they currently 
reside. We evacuated the ride-out crew on Tuesday, August 29 for 
their safety. As of August 30, most of the refrigeration units have 
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failed due to flooding. The site itself is now completely flooded and 
inaccessible except by boat. In conjunction with the Department 
of Homeland Security and the State of Texas, Arkema has set up 
a command post in an off-site location near the plant.88 
“With the power out and cooling systems failing, volatile organic 
peroxides exploded multiple times over the course of a week, 
producing towering pillars of fire and thick plumes of black 
smoke.”89 In all, “[m]ore than 200 residents had to evacuate 
because of the chemical fumes and noxious smoke caused by [the 
fire], and 21 people sought medical attention.”90 In particular, “15 
public safety officers were treated at a hospital after inhaling 
smoke from chemical fires that followed the explosions.”91 These 
“sickened first responders” later filed suit, “as have Harris and 
Liberty counties, which claim the company violated numerous 
environmental and safety regulations.”92 
4. Houston’s Post-Harvey Toxic Exposure 
Houston residents were aware of at least some of the toxic 
releases around them during Harvey itself: “From Aug. 24 to Sept. 
3, callers made 96 reports of oil, chemical or sewage spills across 
southeast Texas.”93 As of March 2018, however, “reporters 
catalogued more than 100 Harvey-related toxic releases — on land, 
in water and in the air. Most were never publicized, and in the case 
of two of the biggest ones, the extent or potential toxicity of the 
releases was initially understated.”94 Notably, many of the 
companies who owned the sites where spills occurred had violated 
environmental laws in their management of those sites in the 
past.95 
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Perhaps most novel was the air pollution problems that 
Harvey generated: “from Aug. 23 to Aug. 30, 46 facilities in 13 
counties reported an estimated 4.6 million pounds of airborne 
emissions that exceeded state limits, an analysis by the 
Environmental Defense Fund, Air Alliance Houston and Public 
Citizen shows.”96 Air pollution issues continued after the storm as 
plants that had shut down for the storm released unusual amounts 
of pollutants in restarting. For example, “[a] giant plastics plant in 
Point Comfort, about 100 miles southwest of Houston, released 
about 1.3 million pounds of excess emissions, including toxic gases 
like benzene, when it restarted after the storm.”97 
Clearly, acute toxic exposures occurred during and 
immediately after the hurricane. For example, in early September, 
Houston recorded “a high benzene level of 324 parts per billion—
more than three times the level at which federal worker safety 
guidelines recommend special breathing equipment.”98 Around the 
San Jacinto Waste Pits, “[p]reliminary data from the EPA 
indicated that in sediment samples taken around the site, dioxins 
levels spiked 2,300 times above acceptable levels.”99 
However, because investigations remain incomplete, the 
longer-term toxic legacy that Harvey gifted to Houston residents is 
less clear. “Texas regulators say they have investigated 89 
incidents, but have yet to announce any enforcement actions.”100 
Nevertheless, government monitoring of residual toxicity in 
Houston has been limited compared to what occurred after 
previous hurricanes, such as Ike (2008) and Katrina (2005).101 
Academic testing and studies suggest that the storm essentially 
washed out the city’s topsoil, leaving relatively few sites with 
worrisome levels of petroleum-related toxins.102 Nevertheless, 
while residents were initially told that the releases posed no threat 
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to human health, as of March 2018, the EPA continued to worry 
about local toxic “hotspots” and the risks that they pose.103 
C. The Long-Term Threat of Toxic Sea-Level Rise 
While hurricanes like Harvey dramatize coastal toxicity and 
its public health risks for coastal inhabitants, sea-level rise (and 
the increased storm surge that comes with it) present coastal 
planners with a far more insidious toxicity problem. First, rising 
seas make coastal storm events worse; indeed, the exacerbation of 
storm surge is the most immediate and significant consequence of 
sea-level rise. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (“IPCC”), “it is likely that extreme sea levels (for 
example, as experienced in storm surges) have increased since 
1970, being mainly the result of mean sea level rise.”104 
Second, in many parts of the United States—notably the Gulf 
Coast—sea-level rise will cause the ocean to progressively 
inundate and saturate existing toxic infrastructure, potentially 
condemning emerging coastal communities and ecosystems to a 
toxic existence. According to the IPCC, global mean sea level rose 
by 0.19 meters over the period 1901 to 2010, and “[t]he rate of sea 
level rise since the mid-19th century has been larger than the 
mean rate during the previous two millennia.”105 The IPCC also 
concluded that the mean rate of global average sea level rise for 
the period from 1993 to 2010 was nearly twice what occurred from 
1901 to 2010.106 
Sea level rise has two main components: melting land-based 
ice (glaciers and ice shelves) and expanding volume as the ocean 
warms.107 Although the two contributors have been roughly equal 
until recently, melting ice and disintegrating ice shelves have 
become significantly more important.108 Sea level rise will continue 
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to accelerate through the 21st century and beyond, affecting a 
projected 95 percent of the ocean area and approximately 70 
percent of coastlines worldwide.109 However, sea level rise will not 
be uniform across regions. For example, “[s]ince 1993, the regional 
rates for the Western Pacific are up to three times larger than the 
global mean, while those for much of the Eastern Pacific are near 
zero or negative.”110 
The future of the planet’s ice presents a worrisome 
uncertainty, and the increasing pace of polar ice melt has added 
significant volatility to the art of sea level rise prediction.111 
Studies repeatedly indicate that the Greenland ice sheet and 
Antarctic ice are melting faster than expected,112 and the IPCC 
noted in 2014 that the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets were 
losing mass, likely at an increasing rate.113 It also noted that 
glaciers around the world have continued to shrink and projected 
that these glaciers, as well as other ice sheets besides Greenland 
and Antarctica, will continue to decrease throughout the 21st 
century, shrinking 15 percent to 85 percent by 2100.114 The IPCC 
concluded that knowledge concerning “[a]brupt and irreversible ice 
loss from the Antarctic ice sheet . . . is insufficient to make a 
quantitative assessment” of its likelihood.115 However, the West 
Antarctic Ice Sheet contains enough ice to raise sea level by five to 
seven meters (17 to 23 feet).116 If all of Antarctica melts, sea level 
will rise approximately 60 meters or almost 200 feet.117 If both 
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Greenland and Antarctica melt completely, sea level would rise 
about 65 meters or approximately 215 feet.118 
Regardless of which of these ice-melt calamities occur and 
when, sea-level rise will continue throughout the 21st century,119 
although its exact impact will vary considerably among coastal 
regions. For example, the U.S. Global Change Research Program 
(the “Program”) has noted that the southeastern region of the 
United States, which includes the Gulf Coast, is particularly at 
risk from sea-level rise, while the Northeast’s threats arise more 
from coastal flooding as a result of increased precipitation and 
coastal storms.120 In the Southeast: 
Global sea level rose about eight inches in the last century and is 
projected to rise another 1 to 4 feet in this century. Large 
numbers of southeastern cities, roads, railways, ports, airports, 
oil and gas facilities, and water supplies are vulnerable to the 
impacts of sea level rise. Major cities like New Orleans, with 
roughly half of its population below sea level, Miami, Tampa, 
Charleston, and Virginia Beach are among those most at risk. 
 
As a result of current sea level rise, the coastline of Puerto Rico 
around Rincòn is being eroded at a rate of 3.3 feet per year. 
Puerto Rico has one of the highest population densities in the 
world, with 56% of the population living in coastal 
municipalities.121 
 As the Program is quick to point out, the economic 
consequences of sea-level rise in the Southeast could be 
considerable. As one example, “Louisiana State Highway 1, heavily 
used for delivering critical oil and gas resources from Port 
Fourchon, is sinking, at the same time sea level is rising, resulting 
in more frequent and more severe flooding during high tides and 
storms. A 90-day shutdown of this road would cost the nation an 
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estimated $7.8 billion.”122 The Program does not mention, however, 
the implications for toxic exposures. 
Along the Pacific coast, in California, “[s]ea level has risen 
approximately 7 inches from 1900 to 2005, and is expected to rise 
at growing rates in this century.”123 Sea-level rise exacerbates 
existing flooding and erosion problems in California, particularly 
during coastal storms and extreme high tides, and projections are 
for increasing damage.124 In the Pacific Northwest, “the effects of 
sea level rise, erosion, inundation, threats to infrastructure and 
habitat, and increasing ocean acidity collectively pose a major 
threat to the region.”125 The damage to critical coastal 
infrastructure could be considerable: 
 The region’s populous coastal cities face rising sea levels, extreme 
high tides, and storm surges, which pose particular risks to 
highways, bridges, power plants, and sewage treatment plants. 
Climate-related challenges also increase risks to critical port 
cities, which handle half of the nation’s incoming shipping 
containers.126 
Notably, as discussed above, much of this infrastructure—sewage 
treatment plants, power plants, urban runoff from highways and 
ports—is also a source of toxicity. 
Thus, even in government reports that acknowledge climate 
change and describe its projected impacts on U.S. coastal 
communities in detail, little attention is paid to the existing and 
potential risks from toxics in the coastal zone. Dealing with this 
toxic load, however, should be added to climate change adaptation 
efforts in this country. As part of that effort, the next Part reviews 
existing laws particularly relevant to reducing the toxic load along 
the nation’s coasts. 
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III. EXISTING FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS 
RELEVANT TO COASTAL TOXICITY 
A. Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) 
As noted, Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to promote the 
cleanup of existing toxic sites. In that sense, CERCLA is best 
characterized as retrospective environmental law (i.e., providing 
for cleanup liability after a hazardous release has already 
occurred) rather than proactive or preventive. Nevertheless, 
CERCLA and its state analogs remain important legal vehicles for 
promoting the cleanup of existing toxic sites along the coast. 
CERCLA is triggered by the release—past or present—of 
hazardous substances from a facility.127 Because CERCLA was one 
of the last major federal environmental statutes that Congress 
enacted, it defines “hazardous substances” by referencing earlier 
legislation—toxic pollutants under the Clean Water Act, 
hazardous wastes under the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act, hazardous air pollutants under the Clean Air Act, and 
imminently hazardous chemicals under the Toxic Substance 
Control Act.128 However, the EPA can also designate additional 
“hazardous substances” particularly for CERCLA.129 
The EPA also designates “reportable quantities” of hazardous 
substances.130 In order to facilitate effective responses to new 
releases of hazardous substances, CERCLA requires “[a]ny person 
in charge of a vessel or an onshore or offshore facility” to 
immediately report releases of hazardous substances in excess of 
the relevant reportable quantities to the National Response Center 
as soon as that person knows of the release.131 CERCLA defines 
“release” broadly to include “any spilling, leaking, pumping, 
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, 
leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment,” except for 
the many kinds of “releases” that are regulated under other 
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statutes.132 Thus, pesticide applications regulated under the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) and 
pollutant discharges regulated under the Clean Water Act are 
exempt from CERCLA’s reporting requirement.133 Otherwise, 
failures to report releases of hazardous substances and false 
reports are subject to criminal penalties.134 
Section 104 of CERCLA authorizes the President of the United 
States—who has since delegated this authority to the EPA—to 
respond to releases of hazardous substances through removal and 
remedial actions.135 Removal actions are the government’s 
immediate response to a spill or release, designed primarily to 
contain the hazardous substances and limit the threat to the 
public.136 Remedial actions, in contrast, are “actions consistent 
with permanent remedy . . . .”137 Both such cleanup actions must 
be consistent with the National Contingency Plan,138 which 
establishes “procedures and standards for responding to releases 
of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants . . . .”139 
Alternatively, the EPA can order abatement actions under 
section 106 of CERCLA.140 As a practical matter, the primary 
difference between a section 104 cleanup and a section 106 cleanup 
is that under section 104, governments perform the cleanup and 
seek reimbursement, while under section 106, potentially 
responsible parties (“PRPs”) perform (and generally pay for) the 
cleanup themselves, subject to federal and/or state supervision.141 
The EPA must notify the affected state before ordering a section 
106 abatement action142 and “shall promulgate regulations 
providing for substantial and meaningful involvement by each 
State in initiation, development, and selection of remedial actions 
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to be undertaken in that State.”143 The affected state also has a 
right to concur (or not) in the federal government’s selection of 
certain remedial actions and a right to intervene in or bring a 
relevant action if the state objects to the remedy that the federal 
government chooses.144 
Section 107 is the heart of CERCLA’s liability scheme. First, 
section 107 identifies four categories of PRPs: 
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility; 
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous 
substance owned or operated any facility at which such 
hazardous substances were disposed of; 
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise 
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a 
transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of 
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, 
by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration 
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and 
containing such hazardous substances; and 
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous 
substance for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, 
incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from 
which there is a release, or a threatened release which 
causes the incurrence of response costs . . . .145 
These PRPs become liable for four kinds of costs and damages: 
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the 
United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe 
not inconsistent with the national contingency plan 
[response costs]; 
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any 
other person consistent with the national contingency 
plan; 
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural 
resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such 
injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release 
[natural resources damages]; and 
 
143. Id. § 9621(f)(1). 
144. Id. § 9621(f)(2)(B).   
145. Id. § 9607(a)(1)–(4). 
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(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study 
[required under section 104].146 
Finally, section 107 provides PRPs with only three defenses: 
(1) if the release and resulting damages were caused solely by “an 
act of God”; (2) if the release and resulting damages were caused 
solely by “an act of war”; or (3) if the release and resulting damages 
were caused solely by “an act or omission of a third party other 
than an employee or agent” of the PRP, and with no contractual 
relationship with the PRP, if the PRP exercised “due care” and 
“took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such 
third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result 
from such acts or omissions . . . .”147 Otherwise, PRPs can pursue a 
variety of settlement options with the governments148 and 
contribution actions against each other.149 
CERCLA’s basic goal is thus to have the people or companies 
who created a contaminated site pay to clean it up. However, 
Congress also created a Hazardous Substance Superfund,150 
funded through a tax on chemical and oil companies, to pay for the 
cleanup of “orphan” sites.151 This tax “expired in 1995, and it has 
not been reinstated,152 with the result that Congress has been 
appropriating money to the Superfund through the normal federal 
budget process. 
While CERCLA remains an important legal aspect of 
promoting coastal cleanups, contamination removal under its 
auspices has been notoriously slow in many circumstances, and 
nothing in the act requires governments to prioritize sites by 
location (say, in the coastal zone). The San Jacinto Waste Pits that 
flooded during Hurricane Harvey provide an apt example. As 
 
146. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A)–(D). 
147. Id. § 9607(b). 
148. Id. § 9622. 
149. Id. § 9613(f)(1). 
150. Id. § 9611. 
151. “Orphan” sites are those for which no financially viable PRPs can be 
found. See Summary of the Conmprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://perma.cc/9NQG-TP4C.  
152. NAT’L PUB. RADIO (NPR), As Tax Expires, EPA Struggles To Clean Up 
Superfund Sites (Aug. 6, 2010), https://perma.cc/7V6C-WYU9; Bryan Anderson, 
Taxpayer dollars fund most oversight and cleanup costs at Superfund sites, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/Z2NN-HP7K.  
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noted, the site first became contaminated in the 1960s, and it has 
long been known for its toxicity. For example, “the Texas Parks 
and Wildlife Department warns people should not eat fish and 
crabs from the area because the animals may be contaminated,” 
and the EPA added the site to the CERCLA NPL in 2008.153 After 
Harvey, then-EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt put the San Jacinto 
Waste Pits on a list of special sites deserving of his personal 
attention, the EPA announced a $115 million plan to remove 
contaminated material from the site, and a court approved an 
agreement whereby two companies would come up with a plan to 
clean up the site.154 However, in April 2018, Pruitt removed the 
San Jacinto Waste Pits from his special list, leaving the companies 
with twenty-nine months—more than two years—to formulate 
their cleanup plan.155 Cleanup at the site, even after Harvey, is 
expected to take more than four years.156 
B. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) 
Congress enacted the Solid Waste Disposal Act (“SWDA”)157 in 
1976, but after the 1980 amendments it has become much more 
commonly known as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(“RCRA”). Unlike CERCLA, RCRA is proactive, seeking to prevent 
new contamination from hazardous waste. Specifically, Congress 
found that “although land is too valuable a national resource to be 
needlessly polluted by discarded materials, most solid waste is 
disposed of on land in open dumps and sanitary landfills” and that 
“disposal of solid waste and hazardous waste in or on the land 
without careful planning and management can present a danger to 
human health and the environment . . .”158 
RCRA applies to “solid waste,” which the statute defines as: 
 any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water 
supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other 
discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or 
contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, 
 
153. Hersher, supra note 61.  
154. Id; see also Regan, supra note 99 (reporting the same figures). 
155. Hersher, supra note 61.  
156. Regan, supra note 99. 
157. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k. 
158. Id. §§ 6901(b)(1)–(2). 
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commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from 
community activities, but does not include solid or dissolved 
material in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved materials in 
irrigation return flows or industrial sources which are point 
sources subject to permits under section 1342 of Title 33 [the 
Clean Water Act], or source, special nuclear, or byproduct 
material as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended . . . .159 
From there, RCRA regulation depends on whether solid waste is 
hazardous or not. 
Nonhazardous solid waste is subject to RCRA Subtitle D. 
Under these provisions, states received the primary authority to 
regulate non-hazardous solid waste. First, they were expected to 
enact state solid waste management plans.160 In order to receive 
federal approval, these state plans had to meet six statutory 
requirements.161 Most importantly, states had to forbid new open 
dumps within their borders and provide for the closing or 
upgrading of all existing open dumps.162 As part of these controls, 
states were expected to implement permit programs for solid waste 
management facilities to control their intake of hazardous 
waste.163 In addition, new disposal could only occur at sanitary 
landfills.164 Under Congress’s requirements, all new, replacement, 
and expanded landfills had to be built with at least two liners and 
leachate collection systems and had to provide for groundwater 
monitoring.165 
RCRA regulation, however, focuses far more stringently on 
hazardous waste, which is regulated under Subtitle C. A 
“hazardous waste” is “a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, 
which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, 
or infectious characteristics may— 
 
159. Id. § 6903(27). 
160. Id. § 6943(a)(1). 
161. Id. § 6943(a). 
162. Id. § 6943(a)(2)–(3). 
163. Id. § 6945(c)(1)(A). 
164. Id. § 6944(b). 
165. Id. § 6924(o)(1)(A)(i)–(ii).  
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(A)  cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in 
mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or 
incapacitating reversible, illness; or 
(B)  pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human 
health or the environment when improperly treated, 
stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise 
managed.166 
The EPA had the responsibility to “develop and promulgate 
criteria for identifying the characteristics of hazardous waste, and 
for listing hazardous waste[,]” and to actually list hazardous 
wastes subject to RCRA’s Subtitle C requirements, “taking into 
account toxicity, persistence, and degradability in nature, 
potential for accumulation in tissue, and other related factors such 
as flammability, corrosiveness, and other hazardous 
characteristics.”167 It identified characteristics that made wastes 
hazardous—ignitability,168 corrosiveness,169 reactivity,170 and 
toxicity171—but also listed specific types of hazardous wastes from 
various types of industries and industrial processes.172 
Subtitle C seeks to regulate hazardous wastes from “cradle to 
grave”—that is, from initial creation to eventual (safe) disposal. 
Hazardous waste generation is “the act or process of producing 
hazardous waste.”173 Hazardous waste generators must keep 
records that identify the hazardous wastes that they generate, 
label those wastes properly, store the waste in appropriate 
containers, begin RCRA’s manifest system to track the waste, and 
provide information and reports about the waste.174 Hazardous 
waste transporters, in turn, must keep records about the waste 
they transport, continue the manifest system, refuse to transport 
improperly labeled hazardous waste, and deliver the waste only to 
permitted treatment, storage, and disposal (“TSD”) facilities.175 
 
166. Id. § 6903(5). 
167. Id. § 6921(a). 
168. 40 C.F.R. § 261.21 (2018). 
169. Id. § 261.22. 
170. Id. § 261.23. 
171. Id. § 261.24. 
172. Id. §§ 261.31–.33  
173. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6903(6). 
174. Id. § 6922(a). 
175. Id. § 6923(a). 
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RCRA rigorously regulates these TSD facilities, requiring 
permitting, financial responsibility, contingency plans, 
recordkeeping, and strict compliance with storage, handling, and 
disposal requirements.176 In addition, as noted above, TSD 
facilities become liable for corrective actions—that is, for cleanups 
at and beyond the TSD facility if hazardous wastes escape.177 
Several facilities located in and near Houston during 
Hurricane Harvey were regulated under Subtitle C. For example, 
the Arkema Chemical Plant in Crosby, Texas that caught fire was 
regulated as a RCRA large quantity hazardous waste generator 
under the Handler ID TXD043750512.178 Until 2011, the plant 
shipped all of its wastes off-site, but by 2013, it was generating 
over 16,000 tons of hazardous waste and handling most of that 
waste on-site.179 It produces a variety of hazardous wastes, 
including toxic metals (arsenic, cadmium, chromium, lead, 
mercury, selenium, and silver), toxic benzene, and toxic 
tetracholoroethylene, among several others.180 Nevertheless, until 
Harvey, the chemical plant was relatively compliant with RCRA; 
the State of Texas had taken only two informal (letter-based) 
enforcement actions under RCRA against the plant, although the 
facility had not been inspected since October 2013.181 
C. Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”) 
The federal Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”)182 
essentially bribes coastal states with federal consistency 
requirements, money, and technical assistance into engaging in 
proactive coastal planning and management.183 Specifically, the 
Act encourages states to create Coastal Zone Management 
Programs that meet 16 detailed requirements,184 most of which are 
 
176. Id. § 6924(a). 
177. Id. § 6924(v). 
178. RCRA Info Facility Information – Arkema Crosby Plant, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, https://perma.cc/U2TZ-DC6C. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Detailed Facility Report – Arkema Crosby Plant, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, https://perma.cc/8PTT-HZNG. 
182. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451–1466 (West 2018). 
183. See id. §§ 1455–56. 
184. Id. § 1455(d). 
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easily classified as land (and sometimes water) use planning185 or 
governmental organization, authority, and procedures.186 A few 
requirements are fairly specific; for example, coastal states must 
address energy facilities in the coastal zone (including their 
impacts),187 coastal erosion,188 and nonpoint source pollution.189 
The delineated components of a Coastal Zone Management 
Program are certainly broad enough to allow a state to prioritize 
coastal toxicity.190 However, nothing in the Act explicitly mentions 
toxics, toxicity, or hazardous waste. 
Like all coastal states except Alaska, Texas implements an 
approved Coastal Zone Management Program, which it first 
adopted in 1997.191 The state’s goals for its program center around 
Coastal Natural Resource Areas (“CNRAs”). Those goals are: 
 
• To protect, preserve, restore, and enhance the diversity, 
quality, quantity, functions, and values of CNRAs; 
• To ensure sound management of all coastal resources by 
allowing for compatible economic development and 
multiple human uses of the coastal zone; 
• To minimize loss of human life and property due to the 
impairment and loss of protective features of CNRAs; 
• To ensure and enhance planned public access to and 
enjoyment of the coastal zone in a manner that is 
compatible with private property rights and other uses of 
the coastal zone; 
• To balance the benefits from economic development and 
multiple human uses of the coastal zone, the benefits from 
protecting, preserving, restoring, and enhancing CNRAs, 
the benefits from minimizing loss of human life and 
property, and the benefits from public access to and 
enjoyment of the coastal zone; 
 
185. Id. § 1455(d)(2), (9), (11), (12), (13). 
186. Id. § 1455(d)(3)–(7), (10), (14)–(16). 
187. Id. §§ 1455(d)(2)(H), (8). 
188. Id. § 1455(d)(2)(I). 
189. Id. §§ 1455(d)(16), 1455b. 
190. See id. §§ 1456b(a)(2), (4)–(6). 
191. TEX. GEN. LAND OFFICE, TEXAS COASTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM: 2015-16 
BIENNIAL REPORT  -2 (2016) https://perma.cc/2CBF-FQ3D. 
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• To coordinate agency and subdivision decision-making 
affecting CNRAs by establishing clear, objective policies 
for the management of CNRAs; 
• To make agency and subdivision decision-making 
affecting CNRAs efficient by identifying and addressing 
duplication and conflicts among local, state, and federal 
regulatory and other programs for the management of 
CNRAs; 
• To make agency and subdivision decision-making 
affecting CNRAs more effective by employing the most 
comprehensive, accurate, and reliable information and 
scientific data available and by developing, distributing 
for public comment, and maintaining a coordinated, 
publicly accessible geographic information system (“GIS”) 
of maps of the coastal zone and CNRAs at the earliest 
possible date; 
• To make coastal management processes visible, coherent, 
accessible, and accountable to the people of Texas by 
providing for public participation in the ongoing 
development and implementation of the CMP; and 
• To educate the public about the principal coastal problems 
of state concern and technology available for the 
protection and improved management of CNRAs.192 
 
In addition, however, Texas is pursuing a coastal resiliency 
program, with public meetings focused on “increasing economic 
and environmental vulnerabilities, resulting from population 
growth, increased storm intensity, and shoreline erosion” and on 
“planning for changing conditions and future storm hazards along 
the coast.”193 In addition, the Program “is developing the Master 
Plan, a long-term framework intended to mitigate damage from 
future coastal natural disasters and preserve and enhance the 
state’s coastal natural resources and assets.”194 Nevertheless, 
although coastal infrastructure is clearly part of these discussions 
and resiliency planning, none of the identified strategies—“1) 
restoring Texas’s beaches and dunes; 2) bay shoreline stabilization 
 
192. Id. at 3. 
193. Id. at 10. 
194. Id. 
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and estuarine wetland restoration (living shorelines); 3) stabilizing 
the GIWW; 4) freshwater wetland and coastal uplands 
conservation; 5) delta and lagoon restoration; 6) oyster reef 
creation and restoration; 7) rookery island creation and 
restoration; and 8) plans, policies, and programs”195—acknowledge 
coastal toxicity as a possible problem. 
Toxicity consciousness may emerge in some parts of Texas at 
a more local level. For example, using grants from the Coastal Zone 
Management Program, Galveston Bay engaged both in a 
contaminated seafood warning program to educate subsistence and 
recreational fishers, especially in low-income and Spanish-
speaking immigrant communities, “about the risk of consuming 
seafood contaminated with toxic substances” and a program to 
educate boaters about their wastes—most recently, the illegality of 
sewage discharges but with additional issues slated for future 
years.196 These developments thus suggest that Galveston might 
be one of the Texas coastal municipalities that is most open to 
dealing more proactively with coastal toxicity problems. 
D. State and Local Land Use Planning 
Unlike environmental and natural resource regulation, land 
use planning is usually the particular province of municipalities, 
and this aspect of local law can be critical to dealing with climate 
change and its impacts. C40, “a network of the world’s megacities 
committed to addressing climate change,”197 has underscored the 
importance of land use planning as follows: 
Land use planning provides the strategic framework for the 
growth of a city, determining the physical uses of space that will 
influence how people live and move, for generations to come. 
Cities have significant authority over land use policies and 
regulations. . . . It is particularly important that cities have a 
good plan for how they will address growth, because as C40 
 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 16, 18, 22, 26. 
197. About C40, C40 CITIES, https://perma.cc/RGC3-H4CC. 
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research has shown, the planning decisions made today will have 
a major impact on the carbon emissions of tomorrow.198 
By this organization’s international count, “79% of cities have the 
power to set land use policies and regulations and 81% are 
responsible for carrying out the function of land use planning.”199 
Land use planning is also relevant to latent and cumulative 
toxicity concerns. Indeed, “[l]and use data are increasingly 
understood as important indicators of potential environmental 
health risk in urban areas where micro-scale or neighborhood level 
hazard exposure data are not routinely collected.”200 In 2003, a 
National Academy of Public Administration panel reported to the 
EPA that municipalities could use land use law more effectively to 
reduce residents’ cumulative toxic exposures. Most directly, “local 
planning and zoning authorities could be used to reduce adverse 
impacts where industrial and residential areas are located near 
each other.”201 Notably, however, the report also advocated greater 
coordination and interaction between states and local governments 
to best deploy land use planning tools. For example, it 
recommended that states take steps to ensure local government 
participation in environmental permitting decisions (such as 
RCRA permitting decisions made through delegated federal 
authority), because “[t]hrough active involvement, local 
governments can help ensure that proposed environmental 
permits contain the conditions necessary to protect public health 
and the environment at the community level.”202 The report saw 
great promise for such increased cooperation, concluding that “[i]f 
state and local officials make creative and aggressive use of 
existing legal authorities, it may be possible to resolve the 
environmental and public health concerns of community 
residents.”203 
 
198. LAND USE PLANNING: NETWORK OVERVIEW, C40 CITIES, 
https://perma.cc/2ZCP-HPDT. 
199. Id. 
200. Jason Corburn, Urban Land Use, Air Toxics and Public Health: 
Assessing Hazardous Exposures at the Neighborhood Scale, 27 ENVTL. IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT REV. 145, 145 (2007). 
201. NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., ADDRESSING COMMUNITY CONCERNS: HOW 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE RELATES TO LAND USE PLANNING AND ZONING 18 (2003), 
https://perma.cc/6ELE-FBNL. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 19. 
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Houston is infamous, however, for its lack of land use 
planning: “The city of Houston proper is unique among large US 
cities in that it has no traditional use-based zoning (ala-Sim City: 
residential here, commercial there, etc.) . . . .”204 However, that 
doesn’t mean that development is completely haphazard. The city 
itself “regulates land use in many other ways, such as minimum-
parking requirements. Many neighborhoods have homeowners 
associations and deed restrictions that limit what can be built. And 
Houston’s suburbs largely do have zoning.”205 
Notably, in the immediate wake of Harvey, both local and 
national pundits debated the contribution of Houston’s land use 
planning to the severity of the flooding, particularly in terms of 
wetlands destruction and building in floodplains.206 Less 
flamboyant were several pre-Harvey examinations of the 
relationship between Houston area’s land use planning and 
residents’ potential toxic exposure. For example, Houston passed a 
hazardous materials ordinance in 1996 that prevents hazardous 
facilities from locating in neighborhoods that are more than one-
third residential.207 However, like most such laws, this ordinance 
did not apply to hazardous facilities already in existence, 
effectively allowing those existing facilities to continue.208 
 
204. Daniel Herriges, Houston Isn’t Flooded Because of Its Land Use 
Planning, STRONG TOWNS (Aug. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/LK4Q-EAXP; see also 
Nolan Gray, How Houston Regulates Land Use, MARKET URBANISM (Sept. 19, 
2016), https://perma.cc/JLV9-QF45 (“Unlike every other major U.S. city, Houston 
doesn’t mandate the separation of residential, commercial, and industrial 
developments. This means that restaurants, homes, warehouses, and offices are 
free to mix as the market allows. As many have pointed out, however, market-
driven separation of incompatible uses—think strip clubs and preschools—is 
common in Houston.”). 
205. Herriges, supra note 204. 
206. Compare id., and Emily Hamilton, What Houston’s Critics Get Wrong: 
Land-Use Regulations Weren’t to Blame for Hurricane Harvey’s Destruction, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/2SEU-977B, with Ana 
Campoy & David Yanofsky, Houston’s Flooding Shows What Happens When You 
Ignore Science and Let Developers Run Rampant, QUARTZ (Aug. 29, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/KS2A-WU5D, and Shawn Boburg & Beth Reinhard, Houston’s 
‘Wild West’ Growth: How the City’s Development May Have Contributed to 
Devastating Flooding, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/9PUM-PP2G.   
207. Lydia DePillis, How Zoning Impacts Your Proximity to Pollution: Sixty-
Five Percent of Houston is Within a Mile of a Toxic Emitter, HOUS. CHRON. (Sept. 
20, 2016, 4:13 PM), https://perma.cc/ZL4G-VCM3. 
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A team of economists from the University of Pittsburgh and 
University of Washington, Bothell, happened to be assessing the 
long-term effect of zoning in Chicago across Hurricane Harvey’s 
timeframe, drafting their results in 2016 but publishing in May 
2018.209 Because of Houston’s resistance to traditional zoning, it 
served as the researchers’ control/counterfactual.210 Provocatively, 
65 percent of Houston lies within one mile of a TRI reporting 
facility, compared to 30 percent of Austin, 44 percent of Dallas, and 
43 percent of San Antonio, “suggest[ing] that land use patterns in 
relatively un-regulated Houston differ measurably from 
comparable cities that experienced formal zoning.”211 In addition, 
the researchers’ results for Chicago “strongly suggest that over the 
long-run urban planning has been eﬀective in creating residential 
neighborhoods that are distant from undesirable manufacturing 
uses, and that houses in these neighborhoods are more valuable as 
a result”212—a result the economists clearly view as desirable. 
However, it should be noted that there is another way of 
looking at the researchers’ results, which is that Houston’s 
approach to land use has more fairly spread the city’s overall toxic 
burden across its citizens. Notably, the researchers found that 
areas zoned for manufacturing or commercial use in Chicago were 
statistically more likely to contain TRI reporting facilities213—a 
result that makes inherent intuitive sense. Such concentration of 
toxics-emitting facilities, however, is also a primary source of 
environmental justice concerns, as those who cannot afford the 
more expensive neighborhoods are forced by economics to live with 
additional toxic exposure and risk. 
Regardless of how land use planning distributes toxic 
exposures, such exposures remain public health risks. It is better 
for all concerned to reduce the city’s overall toxic burden in the first 
place. Houston’s 1996 hazardous facility ordinance was more akin 
to Chicago’s separation-of-uses approach to land use planning than 
to a real effort to reduce overall toxicity, but Part IV will discuss 
 
209. See Allison Shertzer et al., Zoning and the Economic Geography of 
Cities, 105 J. URBAN ECON. 20 (2018), https://perma.cc/8K8B-D49A. 
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alternative approaches that better implement a toxicity reduction 
goal. 
E. Tort Law 
Tort is the traditional remedy for preventable damage, and 
four torts in particular are generally associated with releases of 
toxic materials. Strict liability arises when a defendant engages in 
inherently dangerous activities or abnormally dangerous 
conduct.214 Unlike strict liability, negligence is a fault-based 
approach to liability that requires a plaintiff to prove that the 
defendant violated a duty or standard of care, factually and legally 
causing the plaintiff harm.215 Trespass applies to a defendant’s 
physical invasion of the plaintiff’s real property, such as a physical 
spilling of toxic materials onto the plaintiff’s land.216 Finally, 
nuisance allows a plaintiff to recover when a defendant 
unreasonably interferes with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of 
real property.217 “Public nuisance is an unreasonable interference 
with rights held by the public in general,” while private nuisance 
“is an unreasonable interference with the rights of a plaintiff who 
has a possessory interest in the land affected.”218 Like CERCLA, 
however, tort liability is retrospective and reactive: the damage, in 
almost all cases, has already occurred. 
Hurricane Harvey gave rise to several follow-on lawsuits, 
many demonstrating how injured plaintiffs can attempt to use tort 
liability to seek compensation for their exposures to coastal 
toxicity. The Arkema Chemical Plant in Crosby has become a 
particularly cogent defendant as a result of the fires and other toxic 
releases at the plant. In early September 2017, even as Harvey was 
still winding down, “[s]even police, fire and emergency medical 
technicians sued Arkema in Harris County District Court for at 
least $1 million, alleging negligence by the company and 
executives led flammable organic peroxides stored at the site to 
 
214. ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 32 (3rd ed. 2012). 
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ignite after the plant lost power during the storm.”219 Their 
complaint, filed in the Harris County District Court,220 alleges that 
the plaintiffs suffered vomiting and loss of breath while responding 
to the Arkema fires and asserts causes of action for negligence, 
gross negligence, and negligence per se.221 
The next month, residents of Crosby, Texas filed a class action 
lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas, Houston Division, against Arkema,222 alleging negligence, 
trespass, nuisance, property damage, personal injury, failure to 
warn, product liability, ultra-hazardous activity (strict liability), 
gross negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.223 
They seek punitive damages and are asking the court to pierce 
Arkema’s corporate veil so that its parent corporations may also be 
held liable.224 The plaintiffs base their complaints both on the fires 
at the plant and on releases from two water tanks. They allege that 
“an estimated 23,608 pounds of contaminants were released from 
two [water] tanks including: ethylbenzene,mineral spirits, naptha, 
naphthalene, organic peroxides, trimethylbenzene, tert-butyl 
alcohol, 2,5 dimethyl-2,5 di(t-butylperoxy)hexane and t-amyl 
alcohol.”225 In addition, according to the plaintiffs, the smoke and 
ash from the fire released PAHs, toxic metals like antimony, 
volatile organic compounds like acetone, dioxins, furans, and a host 
of other toxic compounds.226 
What is striking in both cases is not just the plaintiffs’ 
assertions of past injuries during the hurricane and its toxic 
releases, but their fears for unknown future injuries. Thus, the 
plaintiff first responders seek not only actual damages for pain 
already suffered and medical care already received, but also 
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“[r]easonable and necessary medical care and expenses which will 
in all reasonable probability be incurred in the future;” “[p]hysical 
pain and suffering in the future;” “[p]hysical impairment which, in 
all reasonable probability, will be suffered in the future;” “[l]oss of 
earning capacity which will, in all probability, be incurred in the 
future;” “[d]isfigurement in the future;” “[m]ental anguish in the 
future;” and “[t]he cost of future medical monitoring.”227 The 
Crosby residents, similarly, seek “[a]n Order establishing a 
Medical Monitoring Program designed to survey as appropriate 
and to protect the Class Members from latent, dread disease, 
funded by the Defendants . . .”228 These cases, therefore, frame the 
Arkema flooding, fire, and releases as the source of true toxic torts, 
plunging the plaintiffs legally into the uncertain world of “futures” 
cases.229 
Studies released in May 2018 suggest that the plaintiffs in 
these cases may have good grounds for their lawsuits.230 The U.S. 
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board found that 
officials at the Arkema chemical plant had been warned over one 
year before Harvey that that plant was at risk of flooding, and it 
concluded in its 154-page report that Arkema “was not prepared 
for the 6 feet of water that wiped out the facility’s power and 
backup generators.”231 However, as the claims for medical 
monitoring and future damages show, the latent toxicity around 
Houston has morphed, because of Hurricane Harvey, into 
psychologically real and legally cognizable worries for all of the 
Arkema-exposed plaintiffs about their future health, with the true 
 
227. Graves Complaint, supra note 220, at 13. 
228. Wheeler Complaint, supra note 222, at 32. 
229. One of the classic problems of toxic torts is the sometimes very long 
latency period between exposure to a toxic agent and manifestation of a disease. 
“Because of these issues, plaintiffs have increasingly sought recovery after 
exposure but before the manifestation of disease has taken place. These ‘futures’ 
cases are among the most hotly debated in toxic tort law.” ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG ET 
AL., TOXIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 668 (2011). Medical 
monitoring is the least controversial of the three typical futures remedies, which 
also include fear of disease and enhanced risk of disease. Id. at 668–711. 
230. Ebbs, supra note 90. 
231. Stuckey, supra note 89 (citing to U.S. CHEM. SAFETY AND HAZARD 
INVESTIGATION BD., ORGANIC PEROXIDE DECOMPOSITION, RELEASE, AND FIRE AT 
ARKEMA CROSBY FOLLOWING HURRICANE HARVEY FLOODING (2018), 
https://perma.cc/ZLT8-AQ2G). 
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future risks that they face from their exposures during Harvey 
very unclear. 
IV. THREE SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING 
A PRECAUTIONARY, HUMAN HEALTH-BASED 
APPROACH TO IMPROVING COASTAL 
ADAPTIVE CAPACITY IN THE 
ANTHROPOCENE 
It can almost always be said, in almost any context, that 
governments could improve both their enforcement of 
environmental and public health laws and their disaster 
preparedness and response. Analyses of Hurricane Harvey in 
Houston certainly support these common suggestions for 
improving coastal responses to hurricanes.232 Nevertheless, 
environmental enforcement and disaster response are largely 
reactionary, rather than precautionary, responses to toxic coasts, 
effectively focused less on protecting public health than on 
supporting coastal industry until such industry causes real 
problems. 
Coastal states and municipalities can pursue more 
precautionary, health-based management policies regarding toxics 
in the coastal zone. Federal law almost always leaves states free to 
pursue more stringent pollution policies than it requires, and new 
technologies can help these governments to de-toxify their coastal 
zones. This Part presents three truly precautionary suggestions 
that serve to promote coastal public health by reducing the ability 
of coastal storms and sea-level rise to produce toxic hazards during 
flooding and inundation. 
 
232. See generally Toxic Impact, supra note 60 (noting, for example, that 
many spills were not reported to emergency responders during Harvey and that 
many of the facilities involved had track records of environmental violations). 
Notably, the Texas Legislature had actually hampered environmental 
enforcement at the municipal level. “Two Texas laws enacted since mid-2015 have 
weakened counties’ ability to police polluters. The first caps at $2.15 million what 
they can collect from polluters in lawsuits. The rest must go to the state. The 
second law took effect Sept. 1. It obliges counties to give the state right of first 
refusal on any pollution enforcement cases, which local officials say could mean 
less punitive action.” Id. 
40https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss1/1
  
2018] Cleaning Up Our Toxic Coasts 41 
A. Clean Up Existing Contaminated Sites 
While, as Part III discussed, legal authorities exist at both the 
federal and state levels to clean up existing toxic waste dumps and 
other hazardous sites, such cleanups have not proceeded as fast as 
they might, nor has coastal contamination been made a priority. 
As a result, “[c]ontaminated sites often go for years and sometimes 
decades without being fully cleaned up.”233 
Finding sufficient funds for these often-expensive cleanups is 
often part of the problem. As noted, the Superfund tax expired in 
1995 and Congress has been funding CERCLA cleanups through 
annual appropriations. In 2015, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (“GAO”) found that both the funding and the 
effectiveness of CERCLA were declining, sometimes 
dramatically.234 Its more specific findings are worth quoting at 
length: 
Annual federal appropriations to the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (EPA) Superfund program generally declined from 
about $2 billion to about $1.1 billion in constant 2013 dollars 
from fiscal years 1999 through 2013. EPA expenditures—from 
these federal appropriations—of site-specific cleanup funds on 
remedial cleanup activities at nonfederal National Priorities List 
(NPL) sites declined from about $0.7 billion to about $0.4 billion 
during the same time period. . . . EPA spent the largest amount 
of cleanup funds in Region 2 [comprising New Jersey, New York, 
Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and eight tribal nations235], 
which accounted for about 32 percent of cleanup funds spent at 
nonfederal NPL sites during this 15-year period. The majority of 
cleanup funds was spent in seven states, with the most funds 
spent in New Jersey—over $2.0 billion in constant 2013 dollars, 
or more than 25 percent of cleanup funds. 
 
From fiscal years 1999 through 2013, the total number of 
nonfederal sites on the NPL annually remained relatively 
constant, while the number of remedial action project 
 
233. Toxics Action Center, supra note 29, at 6. 
234. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-812, Trends in Federal 
Funding and Cleanup of EPA’s Nonfederal National Priorities List Sites 1 (2015), 
https://perma.cc/VJQ3-NA7G [hereinafter Trends in Federal Funding]. 
“Nonfederal” sites are sites that are not federal facilities, i.e.- sites like military 
bases that are owned by the federal government. Id. 
235. EPA Region 2, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://perma.cc/6H8L-6JQ4. 
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completions and construction completions generally 
declined. . . . The total number of nonfederal sites on the NPL 
increased from 1,054 in fiscal year 1999 to 1,158 in fiscal year 
2013, and averaged about 1,100 annually. The number of 
remedial action project completions at nonfederal NPL sites 
generally declined by about 37 percent during the 15-year 
period. Similarly, the number of construction completions at 
nonfederal NPL sites generally declined by about 84 percent 
during the same period.236 
Perhaps surprisingly to many, despite President Trump’s 
February 2018 overall proposal to slash the EPA’s budget, he 
proposed to maintain CERCLA cleanup funding at $1.1 billion for 
fiscal year 2019 and has proposed other mechanisms for funding 
cleanups as part of his infrastructure package.237 While some of 
these proposals, like giving CERCLA cleanups “access to financing 
under the Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act 
(“WIFIA”) lending program to address contamination to water 
resources,” might simply shift existing money from other 
environmental issues to cleanups, others would expand the grant 
money available to cleanup both brownfields and NPL sites.238 
In March 2018, Congress appropriated almost $1.1 billion to 
the Superfund, although that money can also be transferred to 
other federal agencies.239 It also directly provided $80 million in 
state and tribal assistance grants under CERCLA,240 over $77 
million to the National Institutes of Health for CERCLA-required 
health studies,241 and over $74 million to the Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry for health risk assessments 
under CERCLA.242 In addition, under the heading of 
“Infrastructure,” Congress added another $63 million for the EPA’s 
CERCLA activities, $650 million for the state and tribal grants 
program, and $53 million to the EPA’s Water Infrastructure 
 
236. Trends in Federal Funding, supra note 234. 
237. Sylvia Carignan, Trump Proposes New Funding Options for Superfund, 
Brownfields, BNA NEWS, https://perma.cc/KJ88-MQX9. 
238. Id. 
239. Consolidated Appropriations Act 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 
348, 664 (2018). 
240. Id. at 667. 
241. Id. at 680. 
242. Id. 
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Finance and Innovation Program Account for loans.243 Finally, 
Congress enacted the Brownfields Utilization, Investment, and 
Local Development (“BUILD”) Act of 2018 through the budget bill, 
which, inter alia, increases the availability of grants and loans for 
brownfield sites—but not those on the NPL.244 
However, this is not enough money. Thus, there continue to be 
calls to reinstate the Superfund tax,245 and there are also calls to 
increase the EPA’s CERCLA enforcement financing, providing the 
agency the ability to force the liable parties to pay for cleanups.246 
Direct citizen actions offer an alternative approach. The 
ultimate “fix” to coastal cleanups is altered public priorities that 
can put sufficient pressure on politicians at all levels of 
government to provide the funding and personnel necessary to 
expedite de-toxifying actions. In the meantime, citizen lawsuits 
can sometimes provide a second-best jump-start. Unlike most 
federal environmental laws, however, CERCLA’s citizen suit 
provision247 is of limited use to plaintiffs who are not themselves 
liable under the Act to try to force actual cleanups, because: (1) 
many of the damages that plaintiffs would seek are not “response 
costs” recoverable under CERCLA;248 (2) individuals, NGOs, and 
cities cannot seek natural resources damages;249 and (3) CERCLA 
includes a fairly stringent bar to any citizen suit that challenges 
an ongoing cleanup, including suits seeking to strengthen that 
effort.250 Nevertheless, RCRA’s citizen suit provision can often (but 
not always) fill in, because it allows plaintiffs to bring suit “against 
any person . . . who has contributed or is contributing to the past 
or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or 
disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an 
 
243. Id. at 694. 
244. Id. at 1055–59.  
245. Bryan Anderson, Taxpayer Dollars Fund Most Oversight and Cleanup 
Costs at Superfund Sites, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/6FL6-
QDA2 (quoting Christina Todd). 
246. Elliott Gilberg, Funding the Superfund, WASH. POST, 
https://perma.cc/2YKJ-FFYJ. 
247. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9659. 
248. See e.g., Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 413, 416–18 (M.D. Pa. 
1989). 
249. Id. at 418–19; see also City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 
833 F. Supp. 646, 652 (N.D. Oh. 1993). 
250. 42 U.S.C.A § 9613(h). 
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imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the 
environment . . . .”251 While litigation also requires money, RCRA 
allows courts to award costs and attorney fees to successful 
plaintiffs,252 and, like most federal environmental citizen suit 
provisions, it preserves plaintiffs’ tort remedies.253 
Cities can also act to effectuate coastal cleanups. As one 
example, the City of Emeryville, California, located between 
Berkeley and Oakland on San Francisco Bay, was essentially one 
large brownfield site.254 Specifically, “[a]s large industries began to 
contract and relocate to other cities in the 1970s, they left behind 
properties with toxins that had to be cleaned up before other 
businesses could use them.”255 To address these sites, the City 
assembled state and federal grants both to clean up properties that 
it owns and to make loans to private property owners for private 
remediation.256 One of the city’s current projects will become a 
greenway; another will be turned into affordable housing.257 
B. Implement Toxic-Aware Land Use and Waste 
Management Planning Along the Coast 
While cleaning up legacy toxicity remains a significant 
political challenge, coastal municipalities and states can take a 
number of other measures to reduce the toxic load on the nation’s 
coasts moving forward. One avenue is to revamp land use planning 
to more directly address toxicity issues. The National Academy of 
Public Administration panel, for example, made several 
recommendations relevant to municipalities seeking to avoid 
concentrations of toxic and hazardous facilities in particular areas. 
First, such municipalities should “take steps to eliminate existing 
nonconforming uses that present public health and environmental 
hazards.”258 Second, “they should adopt more flexible zoning 
techniques, such as: 
 
251. Id. § 6972(a)(1)(B). 
252. Id. § 6972(e). 
253. Id. § 6972(f).  
254. Brownfield Program, EMERYVILLE, CA, https://perma.cc/CX3D-TRE2.  
255. Id. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
258. NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., supra note 201, at 19. 
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• Setting up conditional uses that impose restrictions on 
certain uses that may affect environmental justice issues; 
• Establishing overlay zones that impose additional 
requirements to provide for additional environmental 
protections; 
• Using performance zoning to regulate the adverse 
impacts of nuisance-like activities, such as noise and odor; 
and 
• Establishing buffer zones in transitional areas between 
incompatible land uses, especially for industrial uses 
adjacent to residential areas.259 
Overall, the panel concluded, “[l]ocal governments can play a 
primary role in identifying neighborhoods where residents face 
multiple environmental and public health risks. However, they 
need help from the other levels of government to develop and 
implement strategies for reducing risks, taking advantage of each 
level’s unique authorities and expertise.”260 
The Toxics Action Center has also recommended toxicity-
reducing actions that states and municipalities can take. First, 
states and municipalities can act to reduce or eliminate persistent 
toxic chemicals in the coastal zone.261 Persistent toxic chemicals 
are slow to break down and lose their toxicity, and “[t]hese 
contaminants can cause cancer, birth defects and other 
reproductive problems, immune system challenges and damage to 
the nervous and respiratory systems.”262 Massachusetts, for 
example, “passed the Toxics Use Reduction Act (TURA), creating a 
highly successful system to assist industrial users of large 
quantities of toxic chemicals to reduce their toxics use. This 
program has been good for public health and also resulted in 
significant cost savings for many participating businesses.”263 
Indeed, reports indicate that between 1990 and 1999, businesses 
in Massachusetts reduced their chemical wastes by 57 percent, 
reduced their use of toxic chemicals by 40 percent, reduced their 
chemical emissions by 80 percent—and saved $15 million in the 
 
259. Id. 
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process.264 Other examples of such state statutes exist, including 
Oregon’s 1989 Toxics Use and Hazardous Waste Reduction Act,265 
which requires any large toxics user in the state to complete a 
toxics use reduction and hazardous waste reduction plan that 
identifies alternatives to its current practices.266 
Second, relatedly, states and municipalities can work to 
reduce specific uses of toxic materials, and hence residents’ direct 
exposures. For example, in 2001 Massachusetts enacted the 
Children and Families Protection Act267 “to reduce children’s 
exposure to harmful pesticides by restricting pesticide use in 
private and public schools and daycare centers and increasing 
right-to-know. Unfortunately, the law has been implemented 
unevenly across the state.”268 
Third, coastal municipalities can work to reduce their overall 
waste streams, working toward a goal of zero waste. For example, 
Nantucket, Massachusetts “diverts more than 92% of waste from 
landfills through aggressive recycling and waste reduction 
practices and has extended the life of the landfill for decades.”269 
C. Enact Building Codes that Minimize the Potential 
for Further Toxic Releases 
Many industrial facilities in Houston essentially threw up 
their hands in trying to prevent releases during Hurricane Harvey. 
The on-site manager of Gulf Coast Energy, for example, declared 
his facility’s release of methanol “‘impossible to contain’” in light of 
the 20-foot floodwaters.270 Similarly, Arkema Chemicals resists 
arguments that it failed to prepare its Crosby chemical plant 
adequately, emphasizing that the flooding during Harvey was 
“unprecedented.”271 
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While lawyers, politicians, scientists, economists, and public 
health officials can (and do) debate how much preparation is “too 
much” in light of increasing risks to coastal communities from 
climate change, coastal storms, sea-level rise, and storm surge, it 
is worth noting that architects and building engineers having been 
putting considerable effort into designing “storm-proof” homes and 
businesses that could greatly reduce toxic contamination from 
flooding. These efforts range from developing better building 
materials, such as bendable glass and ultra-high performance 
concrete,272 to architectural designs intended to deflect wave and 
wind energy rather than merely withstand them.273 Some of these 
are futuristic and rounded; others—like many of those designed for 
Brad Pitt’s Make It Right Foundation to benefit victims of 
Hurricane Katrina—simply modify traditional building shapes 
and incorporate better materials.274 
How exactly buildings are constructed is often dictated by 
building codes. Indeed, as one commentator noted, building codes 
have already been important in reducing hurricane destruction: 
Building codes are the baseline defense against hurricane 
damage. Improved building codes in Florida (the most stringent 
in the nation) after 1992’s Hurricane Andrew required installing 
impact windows, using stronger ties between roofs and walls, and 
securing roof shingles with nails instead of staples, according to 
the Wall Street Journal. And indeed, newer buildings built to 
code fared better during Hurricane Irma.275 
Coastal states and municipalities should thus consider these 
new hurricane-proof designs when updating coastal building codes. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Public health considerations are an important part of climate 
change adaptation strategies. As the U.S. Global Change Research 
Program recognized in 2014, “[p]ublic health actions, especially 
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preparedness and prevention, can do much to protect people from 
some of the impacts of climate change. Early action provides the 
largest health benefits. As threats increase, our ability to adapt to 
future changes may be limited.”276 
Coastal adaptation is a complex subject, but discussions about 
retreat, armoring, and coastal water supplies often ignore or 
sideline the ever-present issue of coastal toxicity. Coastal storms 
like Hurricane Harvey, however, make this toxic potential obvious, 
underscoring its status as both a continuing present threat to 
public health and a future burden on changing coastlines, 
migrating coastal communities, and evolving coastal ecosystems. 
Therefore, a precautionary and health-based approach to coastal 
climate change adaptation—at all of the federal, state, and local 
levels—should explicitly and directly address the reduction of 
coastal toxicity, better employing environmental law, land use 
planning, toxicity prevention statutes and ordinances, and even 
building codes to achieve this goal. 
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